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A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as
the New Establishment Clause Standard
The Supreme Court's 1989 decisions concerning flag-burningland
abortion 2 produced a cloud of controversy which overshadowed other
significant developments in first amendment jurisprudence. In Texas
Monthly v. Bullock 3 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chap-
ter,4 an unusual majority of the Court5 confirmed that the three-pronged
Lemon test, used to analyze establishment clause cases since 1971,6 has
been revised. 7 The revised test reflects greater concern for governmen-
tal "endorsement" of religion and has gradually become the deciding
factor in establishment clause cases. The entire Court has recognized
the importance of endorsement analysis and has begun to refine its
terms. The issue before the Court is no longer whether to use the en-
dorsement test, but how and in what terms to use it.
This Note addresses the emergence of the endorsement test, its im-
pact on the Court's decisions during the 1988 term, problems with the
test's current formulations, and suggested improvements. Part I reviews
the development of establishment clause jurisprudence and the emer-
gence of the endorsement test. Part II analyzes the Texas Monthly and
Allegheny County decisions and the impact of the endorsement test on
1 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (flag-burning upheld as a form of free speech).
2 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (Missouri abortion laws
upheld against privacy right challenge).
3 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
4 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) [hereinafter Allegheny County].
5 The core majority in these cases included justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, and
O'Connor. This voting block is strikingly different from the "conservative" block, which united to
decide twenty cases during the 1988 term by a 5-4 majority, including Justices Rehnquist, White,
Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor. The key vote on this issue is obviously Justice O'Connor, who
abandoned the ChiefJustice's group for that ofJustice Brennan.
6 The test originated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text.
The establishment clause, the first clause in the first amendment, provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. In Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court held that this clause applied to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As illustrated in the case law discussed infra,
notes 9-22 and accompanying text, the application of the establishment clause to actual instances of
alleged governmental support of religion has revealed sharp philosophical divisions among the Jus-
tices. Since its conception, the Lemon test has been at the center of this continual controversy.
7 The endorsement "revision" began with Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). It is now widely used among the circuit courts of appeals. See
Smith v. County ofAlbemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990); ACLU v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098 (6th
Cir. 1990); Kaplan v. Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989); Clayton v. Place, 889 F.2d 192 (8th
Cir. 1989); Foremaster v. St. George, 882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989); Jager v. Douglas County
School Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989); ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655 (3rd Cir. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct.
3086 (1989); United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987); Hernandez
v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989); Christian Science
Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City of San Francisco, 784 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1066 (1987); Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), af'd, 482 U.S. 578
(1987).
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those decisions. Part III examines the problem of perspective in judging
endorsement. Part IV considers other alternatives to and refinements of
the Lemon framework.
I. The Evolution of the Lemon Test and the Emergence of
Endorsement Analysis
Given the surplus of establishment clause surveys, it is unnecessary
to review in detail the history of Supreme Court interpretation of the
establishment clause.8 By way of setting the stage for the endorsement
test, this Part reviews the prominent features of the establishment clause
landscape. Three principal cases illustrate the emergence of the en-
dorsement test.
A. Pre-Endorsement Establishment Clause Analysis
In 1947, the Court, in Everson v. Board of Education,9 laid down the
"strict separationist" view of the establishment clause. Everson set the
tone for the Warren Court's "wall of separation" between church and
state.'0 However, the historical underpinnings of the "wall" metaphor
proved to be contentious'" and its application unpredictable. The War-
ren Court upheld public transportation for parochial students, 12 struck
down optional religious instruction in public schools,13 upheld the re-
lease of students from public school classes to attend private religious
classes elsewhere,' 4 and struck down the recitation of government spon-
sored prayers in public schools. 15 Not only were the decisions hard to
reconcile, they contained no consistent analytical framework. The Court
based its reasoning on varying interpretations of precedent and an ever-
changing description of the "wall" between church and state.
8 For a more complete review of establishment clause history, see Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at
3099-3101; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-56 (1984); McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-
45 (1961); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947); Beschle, The Conservative as Lib-
eral: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach ofJustice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
151, 152-59 (1987); Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1113
(1988); Felsen, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38
AM. U.L. REv. 395 (1989); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusion: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH L. REv. 266, 268-76 (1987).
9 330 U.S. 1 (1947). "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organization and vice versa." Id. at 16.
10 Id.
11 Several Justices have assailed the historical validity of strict separation and the validity of the
wall metaphor. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("[T]he line of separation, far
from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances
of a particular relationship."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The metaphor itself is
not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists be-
tween church and state."); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-07 (1985) ("There is simply no histor-
ical foundation for the proposition that the framers intended to build the 'wall of separation' that
was constitutionalized in Everson.... The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a meta-
phor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be
frankly and explicitly abandoned.")
12 Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
13 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
14 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
15 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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In 1963, the first structured establishment clause analysis emerged
from the Court.16 The Court adopted a two-step test which required that
a government practice have (1) "a secular legislative purpose" and (2) "a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."' 17 This two-
step test gave substance to the vision of strict separation, and provided
an analytical framework for establishment clause analysis.
The Court expanded this two-step test in 1970 by adding a third
requirement: there must not be "excessive government entanglement
with religion."' 8 The Court explained that, although some interaction
between church and state will occur, it is necessary to avoid situations
where the government is overly involved with religion, such as when "of-
ficial and continuing surveillance" is required. 19
The Court synthesized these three requirements in 1971 in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,20 which a generation of lawyers has regarded as the benchmark
establishment clause case. There the Court set forth the three-pronged
Lemon test, the reigning analytical tool in establishment clause cases. In
order to withstand scrutiny under this test, a government action must (1)
have a secular purpose, (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion in its
principal or primary effect, and (3) not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.21 The aesthetic simplicity of a three-part test, combined
with the sanction of a unanimous Court in Lemon, have contributed to the
virtual enshrinement of the Lemon test as the medium of establishment
clause analysis. 2
2
B. The Development of the Endorsement Test
The membership of the Court has changed considerably since
Lemon. 23 Of the newer Justices, none has had a greater impact on estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence than Justice O'Connor. Her concern with
governmental "endorsement" of religion has led to a substantial revision
of the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test. The transition from
16 Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17 The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say
that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legisla-
tive purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222. The Court utilized this test in Schempp to strike down a Pennsylvania law requiring public
school teachers to read Bible passages each morning.
18 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
19 Id. at 675. On this basis, the Court upheld a property tax exemption for religious organiza-
tions because it entangles government and religion less than would "tax valuations, tax liens, tax
foreclosures" and related procedures. Id. at 674.
20 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21 Id. at 612-13.
22 A potential fourth prong, whether the governmental act causes "political divisiveness," arose
in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-404 (1983). However, the Court made it clear in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984), that generally it is not necessary to inquire into political
divisiveness.
23 Between 1970 and 1984, four members of the Court retired and were replaced. Justice Pow-
ell replaced Justice Black and Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan in 1971; Justice Stevens
replaced Justice Douglas in 1975; andJustice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart in 1981.
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the traditional Lemon test to the endorsement-modified test occurred in
three principal cases.
1. Lynch v. Donnelly:24 The First Suggestion of Endorsement
In 1984, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Christmas
display erected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in a private park
within the city's shopping district. The display included a Santa Claus
house, reindeer pulling a sleigh, a Christmas tree, a talking wishing well,
several hundred colored lights, and a creche.2 5 Of the five Justices re-
maining from the Lemon court, three found that displaying the creche
failed the three-pronged test,2 6 while two believed the creche was accept-
able in its secular surroundings. 27 The new Justices were also divided.
Justice O'Connor provided the swing vote in favor of upholding the
creche; she joined the majority opinion, but also wrote a separate
concurrence. 28
In Lynch, the majority utilized the Lemon test in a straightforward
manner, but emphasized that it did not see itself bound by the Lemon
Court's "strict separationist" philosophy. 29 Instead, the Court hinted at a
more permissive stance toward governmental action in religious matters.
Perhaps to distance herself from this philosophical turn, Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to "suggest a clarification in our Establish-
ment Clause doctrine." 30
Her suggestion was to revise the purpose and effect prongs of the
Lemon test so as to "clarify" the relationship between the test and "the
principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause." 31 Justice O'Connor
revealed that she was motivated to suggest this revision because of her
growing concern for the feelings of religious minorities.
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adher-
ence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community. . . . [Governmental endorsement of religion]
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political com-
munity. Disapproval sends the opposite message.3 2
From this perspective, Justice O'Connor suggested a shift in the focus of
the purpose and effect inquiry toward detecting governmental "endorse-
24 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
25 Id. at 671.
26 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
27 ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White.
28 Justice O'Connor's role as a "swing vote" is further illustrated in Texas Monthly and Allegheny
County, where she joined the four Justices who dissented in Lynch. See supra note 3.
29 [The wall] metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of
the relationship that in fact exists between church and state .... It has never been thought
either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation . Nor does the
Constitution require complete separation of church and state ....
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)).
30 Id. at 687.
31 Id. at 688-89.
32 Id. at 687-88.
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ment" of religion.3 3 Justice O'Connor left the entanglement prong of
the Lemon test undisturbed. 34 Under the revised test, she concluded that
the Lynch creche did not violate the establishment clause.3 5
Three Justices joined Justice Brennan in dissent. Justice Brennan
echoed Justice O'Connor's concern with the impact of government ac-
tion upon a person's sense of belonging in the political community.36
The dissent did not explicitly adopt the suggested revision of the Lemon
test, but Justices Brennan and Blackmun have frequently cited this opin-
ion as precedent in later opinions in which they use the endorsement
test.
2. Wallace v. Jaffree:3 7 Endorsement Language First Appears in a
Majority Opinion
In 1985, after Lynch, the Court considered an Alabama statute that
provided for a m6ment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer."38
Two members of the Lynch majority, Justices Powell and O'Connor,
joined the four dissenters in Lynch to strike down the statute under the
establishment clause. For the first time, a majority of the court referred
to endorsement in applying the Lemon test. Justice O'Connor did not
join in the majority opinion, but provided a careful endorsement analysis
in a separate concurring opinion.39
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began his analysis with the
three-pronged approach suggested in Lemon. Focusing first on the pur-
pose prong, he began with a reference to Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Lynch: "In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask
'whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion.' "40 Justice Stevens concluded that the answer to this question
33 Justice O'Connor stated her revised approach as follows:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to en-
dorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of govern-
ment's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement
or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged prac-
tice invalid.
Id. at 690. For the original statement of the Lemon test, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689.
35 "I cannot say that the particular creche display at issue in this case was intended to endorse or
had the effect of endorsing Christianity." Id. at 694.
36 The 'primary effect' of including a nativity scene in the city's display is, as the District
Court found, to place the government's imprimatur of approval on the particular religious
beliefs exemplified by the creche. Those who believe in the message of the nativity receive
the unique and exclusive benefit of public recognition and approval of their views. For
many, the city's decision to include the creche as part of its extensive and costly efforts to
celebrate Christmas can only mean that the prestige of the government has been conferred
on the beliefs associated with the creche .... The effect on minority religious groups, as
well on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their views are not
similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support.
Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
37 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
38 Id. at 40.
39 Id. at 67.
40 Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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was dispositive, and framed the conclusion of the Court in the language
of the endorsement test.
41
In concurrence, Justice O'Connor referred extensively to her "sug-
gested refinement of the Lemon test" in Lynch. 42 Again, she stressed her
concern with the impact of the statute on members of religious minori-
ties, who may feel they are not full members of the political community.
43
From this perspective, she re-framed the issue in Wallace: "The crucial
question is whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the
message that children should use the moment of silence for prayer."
44
In addressing the "purpose" of the statute, Justice O'Connor in-
sisted that it was necessary "to examine [its] history, language, and ad-
ministration. '45 This inquiry should be "deferential and limited," as the
Court "has no license to psychoanalyze the legislators. ' 46 Even within
this limited scope of review, Justice O'Connor concluded that the statute
at issue "was intended to convey a message of state encouragement and
endorsement of religion," and therefore violated the establishment
clause.4
7
Justice O'Connor also looked at the Alabama statute in light of the
"effect" prong of the Lemon test. She reemphasized endorsement analy-
sis and the revision she suggested in Lynch: "The relevant issue is
whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative his-
tory, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state en-
dorsement of prayer in public schools."'48 The idea that the "effect of
endorsement" should be judged by an "objective observer" altered the
endorsement test in a troubling way.
49
In the second portion of her concurrence in Wallace, Justice
O'Connor hinted at the reason she sided with the Lynch dissenters. She
addressed Justice Rehnquist's lengthy dissent, in which he suggested that
the Court completely abandon the Lemon test. Justice O'Connor here
perceived Justice Rehnquist as "urg[ing] the Court to correct the histori-
cal inaccuracies in its past decisions by embracing a far more restricted
interpretation of the Establishment Clause." 50 By thus contrasting her
position with that of Justice Rehnquist on this issue, Justice O'Connor
gave insight into what otherwise seemed to be an aberration in the voting
patterns of the Court.
41 The legislature enacted [the statute] ... for the sole purpose of expressing the State's
endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday. The
addition of "or voluntary prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as
a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that
the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 69, 76.
43 Id. at 69.
44 Id. at 73.
45 Id. at 74.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 78.
48 Id. at 76.
49 See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
50 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 79.
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3. School District v. Ball:5 ' Endorsement Analysis Evolves
After Wallace, the most significant use of the endorsement test oc-
curred in School District v. Ball, a 1985 case involving public school in-
struction at private schools. 52 Decided only a month after Wallace, this
case gave Justice Brennan his first opportunity, as author of a majority
opinion, to utilize the endorsement test to invalidate a government ac-
tion. Justice O'Connor wrote another separate opinion, this time con-
curring in part and dissenting in part.
55
The issue in Ball was the constitutionality of two programs run by
the Grand Rapids School District. Each program involved public school
employees teaching "remedial" and "enrichment" courses at parochial
schools. Since the lower courts had agreed that the "purpose" of these
programs was "manifestly secular," Justice Brennan's majority opinion
focused on their "effect."
54
Here,Justice Brennan cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch
to support his view that the programs "provide a crucial symbolic link
51 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
52 The Court used endorsement analysis, to a lesser extent than in Ball, in six other cases de-
cided after Wallace and before Texas Monthly and Allegheny County.
In Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570-79 (1988), ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who has also
spoken in disparaging terms about Lemon, applied strict Lemon test analysis in upholding the Adoles-
cent Family Life Act, which authorizes federal grants to organizations for services and research in the
area of adolescent sexual relations. Again, Justice O'Connor concurred, but this time made only
passing reference to the endorsement test. Id at 2581-82. Four dissenters, led byJustice Blackmun,
would have struck down the statute because it "without a doubt, endorses religion." Id at 2597.
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 335-40 (1987), Justice White, who concurred in Lemon but has since disavowed its
approach, wrote for the majority in upholding a statute along straightforward Lemon lines. Justice
O'Connor once again concurred and "clarified" the majority's analysis and use of the endorsement
test. Id. at 346-49.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580-97 (1987),Justice Brennan led the majority in hold-
ing Louisiana's "Creation Science Act" to be an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. Justice
Scalia provided a lengthy dissent in which he objected not only to the endorsement analysis, but to
the entire Lemon approach. Idt at 610-40.
In Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482-90 (1986), Justice
Marshall, acknowledging endorsement analysis in writing for the majority, upheld state funding for
sectarian rehabilitation services. Once again, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion and ex-
panded upon the endorsement analysis. It at 493.
In Aguilar v. Fenton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-14 (1985), which was decided the same day as Ball,
Justice Brennan led the same majority to a similar conclusion with respect to a New York law, but
stressed the entanglement prong and avoided any endorsement analysis. Significantly, Justice
O'Connor argued in a dissenting opinion that the statute should be upheld under an endorsement
analysis. Idt at 421-31.
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 704-11 (1985),Justice O'Connorjoined an
eight-Justice majority which struck down a state statute using the Lemon test without any endorse-
ment analysis. However, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in which she came to the
same conclusion using the endorsement test through the eyes of"an objective observer." Id. at 711.
53 In the wake of Wallace and Ball, commentators noted the emergence of endorsement analysis.
See Beschle, supra note 8; Hurt, The Use of Endorsement in Establishment Clause Analysis-The Key to a New
Consensus, 8 Miss. C. L. REV. 1 (1987); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Toward Religion Under the
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1986);
Smith, supra note 8; Note, Lemon Reconstituted- Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test
for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 465; Note, Wallace v. Jalfree: The Lemon Test
Sweetened, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1273 (1985).
54 Ball, 473 U.S. at 383. The Court found a secular purpose because the subjects being taught
were strictly secular. They included "Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Gymnastics, Year-
book Production, Christmas Arts and Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Chess, Model Building, and Nature
Appreciation." Id. at 376-77.
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between government and religion." 5 5 He then framed the issue as a
blend of his "symbolic link" and Justice O'Connor's endorsement con-
cepts. 56 Justice Brennan referred to the physical proximity of the public
and parochial instruction as a "powerful symbol of state endorsement
and encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the same [class-
rooms] at some other time in the day." 5 7 Based upon this, and other
more straightforward Lemon violations, Justice Brennan concluded that
both of the programs under scrutiny violated the establishment clause by
having "the effect of promoting religion."
58
Justice O'Connor wrote a brief separate opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part. Although she focused on Justice Brennan's "ef-
fect" analysis, she did not refer to the question of endorsement anywhere
in her opinion.5 9
Lynch, Wallace, and Ball illustrate that changes in the composition of
the Court have triggered changes in establishment clause analysis. Jus-
tice O'Connor's sensitivity to the feelings of religious minorities moti-
vated her to propose a revision of the purpose and effect prongs of the
Lemon test which would focus the analysis on endorsement. Writing sep-
arately in concurrence, Justice O'Connor has struggled to define the en-
dorsement test and persuade a majority of the Court to adopt it. The
following two cases, handed down in the 1988 term, reveal that she has
achieved that goal: Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
have joined Justice O'Connor in formally adopting the endorsement test
as the current method of establishment clause analysis.
II. Texas Monthly60 and Allegheny County :61 "Endorsement" of the
Endorsement Test
In the October 1988 term, these two cases, although divergent in
subject matter, established for the first time that Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement analysis has gained a firm foothold in the Court's jurispru-
dence. The Lemon test underwent a metamorphosis, and the sheer
number of opinions and pages of text in these cases indicates that the
development of establishment clause analysis has reached a new plateau.
Although the adoption of a new analytical approach seemed to catch
55 Id. at 385.
Government promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close identification of its pow-
ers and responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious denominations as when it at-
tempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification conveys a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment
Clause is violated.
Id. at 389.
56 It follows that an important concern of the effects test is whether the symbolic union of
church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.
Id. at 390. Justice Brennan also emphasized the impact this might have on an audience of young,
impressionable school children. Id.
57 Id. at 392.
58 Id. at 397.
59 Id. at 388-400.
60 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
61 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
[Vol. 65:671
some justices by surprise, 62 any future attempt to deal with the somewhat
muddled area of establishment clause jurisprudence must necessarily in-
volve the endorsement test.
A. Texas Monthly
The appellant, Texas Monthly, Inc., published a general interest
magazine. Under a prior statute, Texas had exempted magazine sub-
scriptions from its state sales tax.63 During this time, Texas also had ex-
plicitly exempted religious periodicals from this tax.64 However, during
a three year period from 1984-1987, Texas eliminated the sales tax ex-
emption for magazines in general while maintaining the exemption for
religious periodicals. Texas Monthly paid nearly $150,000 in sales tax
under protest and sued to recover the payments on establishment clause
and free press clause grounds.
6 5
The state trial court found that the religious exemption violated
both the establishment clause and the free press clause and struck down
the tax as applied to nonreligious periodicals. 66 The Texas Court of Ap-
peals applied the Lemon test and reversed the judgment of the trial
court.6
7
In the United States Supreme Court, this case produced four differ-
ent opinions containing four different modes of analysis. Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, announced the judgment of
the Court. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion relied heavily upon both
his own dissent and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch.68 Justice
White concurred in the judgment and based his decision on free press
clause grounds. 69 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, also
concurred in the judgment but would have decided the case on a more
narrow basis.70 Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Kennedy, dissented citing overriding free exercise values.
71
1. The Plurality
The plurality decided that the trial court had properly concluded
that the religious exemption violated the establishment clause.7 2 Justice
Brennan noted that, in examining a challenged statute:
62 Id. at 3141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[The majority's opinion in this case suggests that this
novel theory is fast becoming a permanent accretion to the law.")
63 TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 151.320 (Vernon 1982).
64 Texas exempted "[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that
consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of
writings sacred to a religious faith." Tax. TAx CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon 1982).
65 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 894-95.
66 lId at 895. The trial court held that its only course of action was to strike down the tax as
applied to nonreligious periodicals because it was "without power to rewrite the statute to make
religious periodicals subject to tax."
67 Id. The Court of Appeals also rejected Texas Monthly's free press claim.
68 Id. at 894.
69 Id. at 905.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 907.
72 Id. at 894. The plurality chose not to address the free press clause claim. Id.
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[it] is not only that government may not be overtly hostile to religion
but also that it may not place its prestige, coercive authority, or re-
sources behind a single religious faith or behind religious belief in
general, compelling nonadherents to support the practices or prosely-
tizing of favored religious organizations and conveying the message
that those who do not contribute gladly are less than full members of
the community.
7 3
The footnote following this quotation indicated that Justice Brennan
was, in fact, applying endorsement analysis in reaching his decision. 74
The plurality opinion then discusses the necessity of a secular aim or
neutrality as a requirement in such a statute. Recognizing that govern-
ment activities can permissibly benefit religion, Justice Brennan main-
tained that such benefits may only accrue as the result of a policy that
supports a broad secular objective and only incidentally benefits reli-
gious groups.75 Justice Brennan cited Widmar v. Vincent 76 and Walz v. Tax
Commission 77 for the proposition that, in determining the constitutional
validity of such statutes, it is crucial that "the benefits derived by reli-
gious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as
well." 78 It was on this basis that the plurality distinguished Walz, which
was the case most nearly on point.79
The plurality then tied this requirement of a neutral secular aim to
the endorsement framework. The fact that a government action benefits
religious groups does not affect its constitutionality if it also benefits a
large number of nonsectarian groups and has a legitimate secular end.
But when government direcjy subsidizes religious groups exclusively, "it
'provides unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations'
and cannot but 'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted mem-
bers of the community." 80 Therefore, under the plurality approach, any
statute that directly benefits religious groups but is not part of a broader
73 Id. at 896. Justice Brennan footnoted this passage and cited with approval Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Wallace. "[T]he Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes ad-
herence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community." Id. at 896 n. I (quot-
ing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (1985)).
74 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 896 n. 1. Stating that Justice O'Connor's Wallace concurrence
"properly emphasized" this point, Justice Brennan noted, "Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and
effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion
and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement." Id.
75 Id. at 897.
76 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (The Court held that a state university which allows students to use its
facilities may not deny access to students who wish to use the areas for religious worship or discus-
sion). Justice Brennan referred to Widmar to support this point: "Although religious groups benefit
from access to university facilities, a state university may not discriminate against them based on the
content of their speech, and the university need not ban all student group meetings on campus in
order to avoid providing any assistance to religion." Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 897.
77 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
78 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 897.
79 In Walz, the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption which applied to certain non-
profit organizations, including religious properties. The plurality in Texas Monthly maintained that
this decision was based on the fact the exemption furthered legitimate secular goals and only inci-
dentally benefited religious groups. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 898-99. But the dissenters disagree
with this view of Walz. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
80 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 899-900 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church




government policy with a secular purpose is aperse violation of the estab-
lishment clause. Since such a statute would provide unjustifiable awards
to religious organizations, the community would automatically perceive
that the government was endorsing religion.
Next, the plurality addressed the issue of whether the free exercise
clause or the establishment clause required the exemption for religious
periodicals. They held that neither clause required the state to make
such an exemption.
2. The Concurring Opinions
Justice White added a short concurrence in this case.8 1 He felt that
the free press clause was dispositive. Citing Arkansas Writer's Project v.
Ragland, 2 theJustice noted that the "[a]ppellant is subject to the tax, but
other publications are not because of the message they carry. This is
plainly forbidden by the Press Clause of the First Amendment."8 3
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, also concurred in the
judgment.8 4 He had more difficulty reconciling the establishment clause
and free exercise clause values. "The Free Exercise Clause suggests that
a special exemption for religious books is required. The Establishment
Clause suggests that a special exemption for religious books is forbid-
den."8 5 The Justice suggested that it is possible for a state to write a
statute consistent with both values. But, this suggestion sounds very sim-
ilar to the plurality's notion that the breadth of the statute is the determi-
native factor.8 6
Finally, Justice Blackmun decided to leave the free exercise issue for
another day, and concluded that a tax exemption "limited to the sale of
religious literature by a religious organization" violates the establish-
ment clause.8 7 In keeping with this view, Justice Blackmun indicated that
if, as appellees suggested at oral argument, the exemption would apply
to atheistic literature distributed by an atheist group, then the statute
would be valid. However, the Justice rejected this construction and
found the statute unconstitutional.
81 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
82 481 U.S. 221 (1987). Arkansas Writer's Project involved an Arkansas sales tax statute which
exempted newspapers, and religious, professional, trade and sports journals. Appellants published
a general interest magazine which the state courts had determined could not take advantage of the
exemption. The Court, perJustice Marshall, held that the statute distinguished between periodicals
based solely upon their content and that "[r]egulations which permit the Government to discrimi-
nate on the basis of content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment." Id. at
229-30 (citation omitted).
83 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 905.
84 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 906.
86 It is possible for a State to write a tax-exemption statute consistent with both values: for
example, a state statute might exempt the sale not only of religious literature distributed by
a religious organization but also of philosophical literature distributed by nonreligious or-
ganizations devoted to such matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being
and nonbeing, right and wrong.
Id.
87 Id. at 907.
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3. The Dissent
In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, accused the majority of demolishing prior precedent
and leaving state tax laws in disarray.88 He felt that Walz was directly on
point and that the plurality's interpretation was implausible at best. Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the decision in Walz was not based upon the fact
that the exemption was broadly drawn and covered the property of non-
religious as well as religious organizations, but upon the idea that an ex-
emption for religious groups is a valid way to guard against the " 'latent
dangers' of government hostility towards religion 'inherent in the impo-
sition of property taxes.' "89
The dissent went on to note that there is conceptual space between
the establishment clause and free exercise clause. Therefore, accommo-
dations of religion that are not required under the free exercise clause
may still be permitted under the establishment clause. Justice Scalia felt
that the Texas tax exemption was arguably required under the free exer-
cise clause, and, if not, then it was certainly close enough to being re-
quired that it fell into the gray area between the clauses.
B. Allegheny County
This controversy arose when the ACLU challenged two holiday dis-
plays in Pittsburgh as violations of the establishment clause. The first
display was a creche located on the grand staircase of the county court-
house. The second was a Chanukah menorah erected outside the city-
county building. The district court, relying on Lynch, 90 held that both the
creche and the menorah were merely parts of larger holiday displays and,
as such, were constitutional. On appeal, a divided panel of the Third
Circuit reversed. The panel distinguished Lynch, and held that the dis-
plays were unconstitutional endorsements of religion. The court based
this holding on the effects prong of the Lemon test and did not consider
whether either display had an improper purpose or fostered impermissi-
ble entanglement between government and religion. 91
The multitude of opinions in this case shows just how divided the
Court is on this issue. Despite this division, a majority of the Court ex-
plicitly adopted the endorsement analysis, as presented in the concurring
and dissenting opinions of Lynch, as the appropriate constitutional
standard.
1. Justice Blackmun's Majority/Plurality Opinion
In the first two parts of his opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined byJus-
tices O'Connor and Stevens, put forth the facts of the case and a rather
significant history of the development of Chanukah and its traditions in
Jewish-American culture. Drawing from the-record and a wide variety of
secondary sources, the Justice painted a picture of Chanukah in America
88 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
89 Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 673).
90 See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
91 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3098.
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as "only a minor festival" 92 which had taken on far greater secular signifi-
cance due to its proximity to Christmas. This secular nature of the
Chanukah festival was of enormous importance in the Justice's final de-
termination of the case.
Then, Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion for a majority of the
Court,9 3 recognized the muddled history of the establishment clause and
reaffirmed the three-pronged Lemon test. In the process, however, the
Court set aside any doubts remaining after Texas Monthly, that Lemon had
been revised in accordance with the concurring and dissenting opinions
in Lynch. "The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits govern-
ment from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or
from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community.' -194 Here, for the first time, a ma-
jority of the Court explicitly adopted the language of "endorsement," as
Justice O'Connor stated it, as the definitive interpretation of the Lemon
test.
If there was any doubt of Justice Blackmun's intent to adopt en-
dorsement analysis, he clearly put it to rest later in his opinion. He criti-
cized the Lynch majority for providing no guidance for future
establishment clause challenges of government action. Instead, he
looked to the concurrence ofJustice O'Connor and the dissent in Lynch
for an analytical framework.
Thus, despite divergence at the bottom line, the five Justices in con-
currence and dissent in Lynch agreed upon the relevant constitutional
principles: the government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitu-
tional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of
the government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its con-
text.... Since Lynch, the Court has made it clear that, when evaluating
the effect of government conduct under the Establishment Clause, we
must ascertain whether "the challenged governmental action is suffi-
ciently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denomi-
nations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents.as a disapproval
of their individual religious choices." 95
By using the language of the endorsement analysis and specifically refer-
ring to Lynch, Justice Blackmun unquestionably indicated that a present
majority of the Court views this analytical tool as the proper way to un-
ravel establishment clause riddles.
Recognizing endorsement analysis as its measuring stick, the Court
applied it to the creche display. The creche scene was the central focus
of the interior decorations of the county courthouse. It was located on
the grand staircase which was the " 'main' and 'most beautiful part' of the
building." 96 The creche consisted of the traditional nativity scene
topped by an angel with a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis
92 Id. at 3097.
93 Id. at 3099. (In Part III-A, Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Ste-
vens and O'Connor.)
94 Id. at 3101 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
95 Id. at 3103 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)).
96 Id. at 3104.
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Deo." 97 In addition, there were no other symbols of the holiday season
in the area except for a "floral frame" of poinsettias and other seasonal
greens.
With this setting in mind, the majority concluded that, despite the
fact that the county government could celebrate Christmas in some secu-
lar manner, "[h]ere, Allegheny County has transgressed [the] line. It has
chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth ofJesus Christ."
9 8
Since, in the view of the majority, the creche in its particular setting sent
a message of endorsement to adherents of Christianity and a message of
disapproval to nonadherents, the display violated the first amendment
and was permanently enjoined.
Finally, Justice Blackmun delivered an opinion on the menorah dis-
play. The dissenters and Justice O'Connor concurred in the result.99
The menorah was part of an outdoor display in front of the city-county
building in Pittsburgh. The center of the display was a 45-foot Christmas
tree with the 18-foot menorah on the right and a sign from the mayor
which was entitled "Salute to Liberty" on the left. 100
Justice Blackmun phrased the issue as, "whether the combined dis-
play of the tree, the sign, and the menorah has the effect of endorsing
both Christian and Jewish faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both
Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same holiday season, which has
attained a secular status in our society."'' Examining the menorah in its
context, as the endorsement test requires, the majority found credence in
the latter interpretation. The government is permitted to celebrate the
secular aspects of Christmas, and the Christmas tree is a constitutionally
permissible symbol of the secular nature of the holiday. Therefore, Jus-
tice Blackmun concluded, the secular Christmas tree and the secular sa-
lute to liberty lend this characteristic to the admittedly religious symbol
of the menorah. 0
2
The significance of Justice Blackmun's opinion lies primarily in its
precedential impact. The indications in Texas Monthly that the Court had
adopted the endorsement test were confirmed. The Court had revised
the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test in keeping with Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinions over the last several years.
97 Id. at 3094.
98 Id. at 3105.
99 Id. at 3111.
100 Id. at 3094-95.
101 Id. at 3113.
102 "In these circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and the menorah communicates,
not a simultaneous endorsement of both Christian andJewish faith, but instead, a secular celebration
of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradi-
tion." Id. at 3114. Note that Justice Blackmun based his decision entirely upon the effects prong:
The conclusion here that, in this particular context, the menorah's display does not have
the effect of endorsing religious faith does not foreclose the possibility that the display of
the menorah might violate either the 'purpose' or 'entanglement' prong of the Lemon analy-
sis. These issues were not addressed by the Court of Appeals and may be considered by
that court on remand.
Id. at 3115.
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2. The Allegheny County Concurring Opinions
The first concurring opinion was that ofJustice O'Connor, who con-
curred in part and concurred in the judgment. Although she joined Jus-
tice Blackmun in his opinion almost entirely, she disagreed with his
application of the endorsement test to the menorah display.
After emphasizing the fact that the circumstances of the particular
governmental activity are of vital importance in endorsement test analy-
sis, 103 Justice O'Connor went on to apply this totality of circumstances
standard to the menorah. She saw Justice Blackmun's treatment of the
issue as the creation of a new standard where "an inference of endorse-
ment arises every time government uses a symbol with religious meaning
ifa 'more secular alternative'is available." 10 4 She further viewed his sub-
sequent finding, that the use of a more religious symbol in this circum-
stance was justified, as an exception to the new rule.
According to Justice O'Connor, the endorsement analysis should
not be bound by such arbitrary constructions as the "more secular alter-
native" test.'0 5 Analytical tools, such as the "more secular alternative"
test, were not part of endorsement analysis when it first appeared in
Lynch, and are an unwelcome addition.
In her own application of endorsement analysis to the menorah dis-
play, Justice O'Connor first looked to the purpose prong of Lemon. Fo-
cusing on the sign which purported to salute liberty, 06 she concluded
that the government's purpose was not to endorse religion.
10 7
Turning to the effects prong and applying the endorsement analysis,
the Justice again concluded that the display was constitutional.
Here, by displaying a secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season
rather than a religious one, the city acknowledged a public holiday cel-
ebrated by both religious and nonreligious citizens alike, and it did so
without endorsing Christian beliefs. A reasonable observer' 08 would,
in my view, appreciate that the combined display is an effort to ac-
knowledge the cultural diversity of our country and to convey toler-
ance of different choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by
recognizing that the winter holiday season is celebrated in diverse
ways by our citizens.109
103 Id. at 3118.
104 Id. at 3124.
105 My conclusion does not depend upon whether or not the city had 'a more secular alterna-
tive symbol' of Chanukah ... just as the Court's decision in Lynch clearly did not turn on
whether the city of Pawtucket could have conveyed its tribute to the Christmas holiday sea-
son by using a 'less religious' alternative to the creche symbol in its display of traditional
holiday symbols.
Id. at 3124.
106 The sign read, "During this holiday season, the City of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these
festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom."
Id. at 3123.
107 "This sign indicates that the city intended to convey its own distinctive message of pluralism
and freedom." Id.
108 Use of the language "reasonable observer" differs from earlier language used by Justice
O'Connor. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
109 AlleghenyCounty, 109 S. Ct. at 3123.
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In effect, the secular nature of the Christmas tree and the sign saluting
liberty are the circumstances surrounding the display of the menorah.
Taken in combination, and applying the totality of circumstances test,
Justice O'Connor's view was that the menorah did not have the unconsti-
tutional effect of endorsing religion. In other words, it did not make
Jews feel like insiders or non-Jews feel that they were not full members of
the political community.
Justice Brennan also wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part. He was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority's handling of the creche dis-
play, but took issue with the Court's conclusion that the menorah was
constitutional.
Although conceding that the Christmas tree can be considered a sec-
ular symbol,' 10justice Brennan was quick to point out that even a Christ-
mas tree, when surrounded by or decorated with other religious symbols,
can take on religious significance. Injustice Brennan's view, bothJustice
Blackmun and Justice O'Connor abandoned the contextual inquiry re-
quired under endorsement analysis in their discussion of the menorah
display.I' The Justice reasoned that it was the decidedly religious na-
ture of the menorah which gave context to the entire display.
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's de-
cision with respect to the menorah."12  After discussing the historical
background of the actual text of the establishment clause, "13 Justice Ste-
vens turned to the issue at hand. He anted yet another analytical chip
into the endorsement pot: "In my opinion the Establishment Clause
should be construed to create a strong presumption against the display
of religious symbols on public property."' 1 4 According to Justice Ste-
vens, the same device that is used in the free press and free speech areas
should have a place in endorsement analysis. Rather than an outright
ban on religious displays of any kind, which may indicate some hostility
to religion, a presumption against the use of religious symbolg by gov-
ernment would "give due regard to religious and nonreligious members
of the society.""1
5
In employing his presumption against religious symbols, Justice Ste-
vens acknowledged that the menorah display may have conveyed a
message of pluralism or of freedom to choose one's own beliefs. How-
ever, the message was not sufficiently clear to overcome the
presumption. "16
The final opinion was that of Justice Kennedy, concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part. He was joined by the ChiefJus-
tice, and Justices White and Scalia. Justice Kennedy concurred in the
110 Id. at 3125.
111 Id. at 3126.
112 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
113 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3129.
114 Id. at 3131.
115 Id. at 3132-33.
116 Id. at3133-34.
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judgment with respect to the menorah and dissented with respect to the
creche.
Justice Kennedy began his opinion by expressing his distaste for the
Lemon test. Although he felt constrained by the Lemon framework, he did
"not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as [the]
primary guide."' "17 Instead, Justice Kennedy proposed his own interpre-
tation of the effects prong of the Lemon test. He focused on coercion.
Under this alternative analysis, two important factors come into play:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise; and it may not,, in the guise of avoiding hostil-
ity or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a de-
gree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so."'1
Justice Kennedy defined coercion rather broadly to include indirect as
well as direct coercion. For example, he indicates that the permanent
erection of a cross on top of a government building could constitute co-
ercion. 119 Justice Kennedy argued that this method of analysis is consis-
tent with the majority opinion in Lynch and the rest of establishment
clause jurisprudence. In addition, the Justice suggested that the major-
ity's handling of this case overruled Lynch sub silentio. 120 Applying his
coercion standard, Justice Kennedy concluded that the government had
not used its power to coerce belief in the tenets of Christianity or Juda-
ism. The government had not required citizens to participate in religious
ceremonies, nor had it used tax money to support one religious faith.
Finally, he concluded that the creche and the menorah are "purely pas-
sive symbols of religious holidays. Passersby who disagree with the
message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to
turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any
other form of government speech."'' Therefore, government may use
nearly any religious symbol that it wishes, within certain parameters.
122
Justice Kennedy then criticized the adoption of the endorsement
test. In his view, the majority's endorsement analysis is out of step with
establishment clause precedent. He argued that consistent application of
endorsement analysis would invalidate many practices which have be-
come a part of our tradition and culture. Although Justice O'Connor
would argue that practices such as legislative prayer, Thanksgiving proc-
lamations and "In God we trust" as the national motto would be safe
under the endorsement test,123 Justice Kennedy feared that these and
similar practices will be found unconstitutional.
The disagreement among the Justices in this area is truly astound-
ing. Texas Monthly and Allegheny County produced nine opinions, various
117 Id. at 3134.
118 Id. at 3136 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
119 Id. at 3137. He adds that when the government's act is symbolic or passive "any intangible
benefit to religion is unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment." Id.
120 Id. at 3140.
121 Id. at 3139.
122 See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
123 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3121.
1990] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
methods of analysis, several proposed analytical tools, and page after
page of often acerbic rhetoric. The establishment clause has seen con-
siderable scrutiny since 1947, yet the Court has not reached anything
close to a consensus. The division is not merely philosophical. There is
disagreement even as to the proper method of analyzing establishment
clause issues. Furthermore, among the majority ofJustices who do agree
that the endorsement test should be used, there is no consistency in ap-
plication. The Justices have even failed to agree on the definition of es-
sential terms.
III. A Closer Look at Current Establishment Clause Analysis: The
Problem of Perspective
While the endorsement test has the benefit of increased sensitivity to
the feelings of religious minorities, it also has some analytical problems.
One of the most intriguing of these problems stems from the revised
"effects" prong of the Lemon test, which now asks whether the statute or
governmental action is perceived as an endorsement of religion. The
problem is the difficulty in finding an appropriate perspective from which
to make this determination. It calls for a sensitivity to the feeling of ex-
clusion which makes the suggested "objective observer" seem impossible
or irrelevant, whereas the alternative "reasonable observer" is too
indefinite. 
24
A. The Problem With Objectivity
One perspective the Court suggested was that of an "objective ob-
server." However, the motivating force behind the entire endorsement
analysis purports to be a new sensitivity to whether adherents of a partic-
ular religion or of religion in general feel favored, or non-adherents feel
left out. 125 Given this emphasis on feeling, it seems appropriate to ques-
tion not only (1) whether "objectivity" is possible, but also (2) whether it
is desirable.
Consider two potential types of objective observers. First, the objec-
tive observer as simply any person, including each of the sitting Justices,
who imagines herself putting on a cloak of objectivity. The problem with
this observer is that one's judgment is so closely linked with personal
experience and values that objectivity, in any meaningful sense, is impos-
sible. To some extent, people can set aside personal biases, be "value-
neutral," and consider a problem from what one understands to be an-
other person's perspective. But the observer is limited by her experience
and understanding of other people, as well as her ability to let go of
deeply held convictions. After a person considers as many perspectives
as he can imagine, he ultimately judges in a way that is consistent with his
own perspective.
If it were possible for people to simply abandon their biases and
judge objectively, opinions would converge. In a relatively homogenous
124 For an alternative criticism of the perspective problem in judging endorsement, and in partic-
ular the "objective observer" problem, see Smith, supra note 8, at 291-95.
125 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text and infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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group such as the Supreme Court, there should be a good chance of
agreement between nine "objective observers." The fractioning of the
Court in recent establishment clause cases demonstrates that objectivity
is not so easily achieved. 126 Disagreement among the Justices, as well as
everyday experience, indicates that it is impossible to judge objectively
simply by cloaking values.
A second potential objective observer is a hypothetical construct, ab-
stracted from the perspective of any one person. The problem with a
hypothetical person, however, is that the persuasive power of personal
experience is lost in the process of abstraction from real to ideal. Real
persons, who cannot identify with an ideal, value-neutral person, will not
be persuaded to adopt its judgments. 127 Real people ask: "Why should
we, who have values, personal experience, and perspective, adopt the
judgments of a fictional character who does not?"'128 If the hypothetical
perspective is one that real people cannot achieve, real people will not be
persuaded to adopt the view it reveals.
Thus, both attempts at objectivity fail to produce the desired result.
The conclusion drawn is that objectivity is an unrealistic attribute of the
endorsement observer. Rather than attempting to construct ideal view-
points, we must accept the perspectives that we have. But even if this
conclusion is false, and some form of objective observer is available, it is
not clear that it would be the most desirable perspective from which to
perceive endorsement.
Initially, Justice O'Connor suggested that objectivity was necessary
to evaluate the effect of a government act. In her initial characterization
of the relevant observer in Lynch v. Donnelly, O'Connor singled out objec-
tive observers as the target of her concern. Because part of the audience
of a government action may not have access to the contextual indicators
of the intent behind the law or practice, Justice O'Connor reasoned, they
may "receive a message determined by the 'objective' content of the state-
ment."' 129 Even if the government does not intend to endorse religion by
its action, that part of the audience which receives only the "objective
content" may still feel the "effect" of endorsement. This is the rationale
for having an effects prong in addition to a purpose prong: actions done
with permissible intent may still have impermissible effects upon those
unaware of the intent.
Justice O'Connor altered this initial formulation of the objective ob-
server in Wallace v. Jaffree: "The relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of [reli-
126 There were four opinions written in the 5-4 Lynch decision, six opinions written in the 6-3
Wallace decision, four opinions written in the 6-3 Texas Monthly decision, and five opinions written in
the 5-4 Allegheny County decision. Opinion might diverge even further if the Court included members
of non-Christian religions.
127 Such was the case when John Rawls attempted to utilize a hypothetical group of "objective"
persons to come to a consensus on the best principles upon which to found a democratic govern-
ment. SeeJ. RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
128 This critique is more fully developed in two essays collected by Norman Daniels. See Nagel,
Rawls on Justice, and Dworkin, The Original Position in READING RAwLs 1, 16 (N. Daniels, ed. 1975).
129 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added).
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gion]."1 30  This characterization involves an observer who has
significantly more information about the statute or practice in question
than did the observer defined in Lynch. Indeed, the new characteristics
clash with the old: whereas the original objective observer was ignorant
of contextual indicators of intent, the new objective observer is aware of
the context. In either case, Justice O'Connor is consistent in her sugges-
tion that the endorsement observer be objective.
However, both formulations conflict with the underlying purpose of
the endorsement test: shifting the focus of analysis from the "advance-
ment or inhibition of religion"' 3 1 to the feelings of individual members
of religious minority groups. As Justice O'Connor has repeatedly ex-
pressed, we have to be aware of government actions which make people
feel they are excluded from full participation in the political commu-
nity.13 2 Rather than calling for a detached, "objective" perspective, this
seems to call for a more empathetic, subjective viewpoint.
This is why objectivity is not the most desirable characteristic for an
endorsement observer. The concept of objectivity is vague, but if it
means anything, it means a detachment from any individual perspective
and detachment from emotion. An objective observer, whether or not he
is acquainted with the legislative history or text of a statute, would not be
in a position to feel the effect of endorsement or disapproval. Instead,
those persons who are most strongly aligned with or against the en-
dorsed religion are more likely to feel the effect.
In summary, the ideal of objectivity is of little use in the endorse-
ment test. It may not be possible to be objective, and even if it is possi-
ble, it may not be desirable to be objective in determining whether or not
a government act has the effect of an endorsement. Perhaps it is for this
reason that the Court, in recent discussions of the endorsement test, has
referred to a "reasonable observer" as the relevant judge of
endorsement.
B. More "Reasonable" Alternatives
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Allegheny County, used
the phrase "reasonable observer" rather than "objective observer" to
describe the relevant perspective for determining whether a government
action has the effect of endorsement.' 33 An initial question raised by this
is whether the phrase "reasonable observer" is meant to be a synonym
for "objective observer," or is rather meant to denote a different per-
spective altogether. A second, more penetrating issue is whether "rea-
130 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76. Justice O'Connor repeated this characterization of the relevant per-
spective in a later opinion: "To ascertain whether the statute conveys a message of endorsement,
the relevant issue is how it would be perceived by an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute." Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the
Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987).
131 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
132 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. This quotation from Lynch was cited by Justice
O'Connor in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 and by Justice Brennan in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct.
890, 896-97 (1989).
133 "[T]he Constitutionality of its effect must also be judged according to the standard of a 'rea-
sonable observer.' "Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3115 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv-
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sonable" is any more useful than "objective" in identifying an
appropriate perspective.
At one point in his concurring opinion in Allegheny County, Justice
Kennedy uses "reasonable observer" and "objective observer" inter-
changeably, implying that the two phrases are synonymous.13 4 However,
neitherJustice Blackmun norJustice O'Connor use the phrase "objective
observer" anywhere in their opinions in this case. Furthermore, both
Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor cite to Professor Tribe's discus-
sion of the endorsement test, where he suggests that a "reasonable non-
adherent" should make the endorsement determination and that reason-
ableness is essential to this task in order to avoid the problem of hyper-
sensitivity.' 3 5 Thus, evidence suggests that in this context, the Court
intends reasonableness to be an improvement upon objectivity, rather
than a synonym.
But the Court's use of the term has thus far been ambiguous-it is
not clear whether any reasonable observer can make the endorsement
determination, or whether one type of reasonable observer is more ideal
than another. To illustrate this ambiguity, compare the use of reasona-
bleness in this context with its use in other areas of the law. In some
instances, reasonable describes a quality of expected behavior.13 6 In
others, reasonable measures a quantity of evidence or behavior.'3 7 It is
ices for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (emphasis added)).
This change was echoed by Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy:
"The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view
such longstanding practices as a disapproval of their religious choices .... Id. at 3121 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
"The notion that cases arising under the Establishment Clause should be decided by an inquiry
into whether a 'reasonable observer' may 'fairly understand' government action to ...." Id. at 3141
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
134 "[T]he very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the objective
observer, easily lends itself to this type of inquiry. If there be such a person as the 'reasonable observer,' I
am quite certain that he or she will take away a salient message .... Id. at 3145 (emphasis added).
135 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-15 (2d ed. 1988).
136 In negligence suits, for example, courts adopted reasonableness to avoid having to make al-
lowance for individual weaknesses such as poor judgment or carelessness. Schwab, The Quest for the
Reasonable Man, 45 TEx. B. J. 178 (1982). This began in Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(C.P. 1837), where a farm worker argued that he used his best judgment in constructing a hayrack
which spontaneously ignited. The plaintiff, a neighbor whose house burned down as a result of the
fire, convinced the court that the farm worker should be held to a higher standard of care, i.e., that of
the reasonable person.
137 In criminal law, reasonableness is part of the standard of proof for conviction: "It is a basic
policy of Anglo-American criminal law that, in view of the serious consequences which follow convic-
tion of crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts
necessary to establish the defendant's guilt." W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, CRIMINAL LAw 48 (1986).
It also describes the level of evidence which a police officer needs in order to arrest, or to stop
and question a suspect. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (under the fourth amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures, an officer must have reasonable grounds to sus-
pect a present danger before he can stop and question an individual); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has commit-
ted a crime before arrest).
Reasonableness is also the key to determining whether there was sufficient provocation to re-
duce a murder charge to manslaughter. See Rauf, The Reasonable Man Test in the Defence of Provocation,
30 CRIM. L. Q. 73 (1987).
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also used to embody an interpretive perspective. 138 In each of these con-
texts, reasonableness standardizes judgment; it is a characteristic which
every person is expected to possess, or a quantity everyone can estimate
intuitively. No matter what values or convictions a person may have, he
is expected to make reasonable judgments.
Such standardization is valuable in determining whether a defendant
should be liable for negligence. It is fundamental in tort law that if a
person has acted unreasonably, even though unintentionally, she is liable
for the damage she causes.13 9 Similarly in criminal law, we expect a per-
son who has been provoked to respond reasonably. If he responds with
unreasonable force or after a reasonable period of cooling off, then the
fact that he has been provoked loses its potential to mitigate.140 Further,
in contract law, if a person is unreasonable in relying upon the promises
of another, she cannot expect the court to estop that other party from
asserting a lack of consideration. 14 1 As a society, we expect everyone to
live up to a universal standard of reasonableness.
However, it is not so easy to standardize judgment in the realm of
religion.' 42 For example, a Protestant would likely find it reasonable to
be sensitive to a reading of the "Hail Mary," or to statues of Mary, as
signs of a Catholic community. Catholics, on the other hand, are likely to
be sensitive to the serving of meat on Good Friday. A Jew may find it
reasonable to be sensitive to any public creche or cross. AJehovah's Wit-
ness may find it proper to be sensitive to the Pledge of Allegiance. An
Atheist may find it entirely reasonable to be sensitive to the phrase "In
God We Trust" on currency. There is no universal standard for reasona-
bleness: a reasonable Jew will have a different perspective than a reason-
able Protestant or a reasonable Muslim, and a reasonable Atheist will
have a different perspective than any Theist.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that reasonableness alone
does not go very far in isolating the relevant perspective for perceiving
endorsement. No one reasonable observer exists in this realm. Whereas
reasonable people of different religions may agree upon the standard of
138 In contract law, reasonableness is used to judge the "objective meaning" of contract lan-
guage. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1946)(Frank, J., concurring)
(We should view manifestations of intent from the standpoint of a reasonable man in the position of
the other party).
It is also used to judge whether or not one party's reliance upon the promise of another was
justified. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee ...... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
For other examples of the ubiquitous reasonableness standard, see 36 WORDS AND PHRASES 405-
664 (1962).
139 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31-32 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1985).
140 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw § 7.10(b),(d) (1986); 10 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED,
Model Penal Code § 210.3 (1974).
141 J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 6-1 (3d ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 90 (1981).
142 Professor Tribe suggests that the Court should use reasonableness to emphasize that the en-
dorsement judgment must be made with the proper level of sensitivity. L. TRIBE, supra note 135,
§ 14-15, at 1293. But this begs the question. People with different religious views are likely to
disagree on the "proper" level of sensitivity.
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care in building a hayrack, they are likely to disagree on what constitutes
an endorsement of religion.
The solution to this problem is to allow any reasonable observer's
genuine objection to signal an establishment clause violation. 4 The in-
sight is simple: reasonable observers may disagree on what constitutes an
endorsement of religion, and there is little ground to favor one perspec-
tive over another. To avoid impermissible effects, it is necessary to give
minority views veto power; if any reasonable observer perceives the gov-
ernmental action as an endorsement of religion, then the action is imper-
missible under the establishment clause. Under this formulation, the
emphasis would shift from reasonableness to the genuineness of the per-
ception of endorsement.' 44 This approach gives more weight to the feel-
ings of religious minorities.' 45
Arguably, however, this again begs the question. On what basis are
courts to determine whether an observer is reasonable or not? Some
Christians may find Hindus and Muslims unreasonable per se, especially
those who take offense at Christmas trees. Given the Christian bias of
the Court, it may be impossible for the present Justices to tell the differ-
ence between the amicus brief of a reasonable Hindu and that of an un-
reasonable Hindu. 146  The most obvious way of making this
determination is to study the beliefs and customs of each group and con-
sider what impact the governmental action might have on members of
that group.
For example, consider the display upheld in Allegheny County, which
consisted of a Christmas tree, a menorah, and a "Salute to Liberty" sign.
Under the "any reasonable observer" formulation, the effects prong of
the endorsement test asks whether any reasonable observer could genu-
inely perceive this as an endorsement of religion. Justice Brennan ar-
gued in dissent that observers who are neither Jewish nor Christian
143 Justice Brennan hints at this approach in his discussion of the menorah at issue in Allegheny
County:
I would not, however, presume to say that my interpretation of the tree's significance is the
"correct" one .... I do not know how we can decide whether it was the tree that stripped
the religious connotations from the menorah, or the menorah that laid bare the religious
origins of the tree. Both are reasonable interpretations of the scene the city presented and
thus both, I think, should satisfy Justice Blackmun's requirement that the display "be
judged according to the standard of a 'reasonable observer.'" I shudder to think that the
only "reasonable observer" is one who shares the particular views on perspective, spacing,
and accent expressed injustice Blackmun's opinion, thus making analysis under the Estab-
lishment Clause look more like an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law.
Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3127 (citations omitted).
144 The inquiry into genuineness could be similar to that which occurs in free exercise cases. See
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (sincerity of beliefs held by conscientious objector
found to be a threshold question); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (whether plaintiff
terminated his job because of an honest conviction that his religion forbade it held to be a primary
issue on review).
145 Professor Tribe suggests that the relevant perspective from which to judge endorsement is
that of "a reasonable non-adherent." L. TRIBE, supra note 135, at 1293. This is illuminating insofar
as it highlights the deficiency in asking a reasonable Christian whether or not a creche in the court-
house is an endorsement of Christianity. Inasmuch as adherents are not as likely to find a govern-
ment endorsement of their religion to be objectionable, this amounts to the same thing as consulting
"any reasonable observer."
146 Ideally, the membership of the Court would represent the religious diversity of the nation.
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perceived the display as an endorsement of those two religions: a weak
attempt by the Christian majority to express religious pluralism. 147 One
can imagine that a reasonable Atheist might genuinely perceive this as a
governmental endorsement of religion over non-religion. If such objec-
tions were genuinely raised, then the governmental act in question cer-
tainly does have the effect of endorsing religion, at least from the
perspective of the objecting parties.
Thus, the problem of perspective reveals that neither "an objective
observer" nor "a reasonable observer" identifies a suitable perspective
for perceiving the effect of endorsement. Objectivity is either impossible
or undesirable, and reasonableness has little power to standardize reli-
gious judgment. If the Court seeks to formulate a test that is consistent
with Justice O'Connor's sensitivity toward the feeling of exclusion from
the political community, it should abandon the idea of seeking "objectiv-
ity" and instead modify the "reasonable" standard to allow for the genu-
ine objection of any reasonable observer to constitute a prima facie
establishment clause violation.
IV. Other Alternatives for Establishment Clause Analysis
Other than modifying the terms of the endorsement test, alternative
suggestions for improving establishment clause analysis have arisen in
recent Supreme Court opinions. In particular, two suggestions come
from Aliegheny County: Justice Kennedy's "coercion test" and Justice Ste-
vens' "presumption of invalidity."
A. Justice Kennedy's "Coercion" Test as an Alternative to Lemon
In his opinion in Allegheny County, Justice Kennedy found certain lim-
iting principles in the history of the Union and establishment clause pre-
cedent. The function of the religion clauses is to prevent the
government from coercing support of or participation in religion. In ad-
dition, the government is prohibited from interfering with or oppressing
worship. In Justice Kennedy's view, "[b]arring all attempts to aid reli-
gion through government coercion goes far toward attainment of this
object."1
48
This "coercion test," of course, depends upon the definition of "co-
ercion." AlthoughJustice Kennedy conceded that recent Supreme Court
cases had rejected the view that coercion is required for an establishment
clause violation, 149 he distinguished these holdings by explaining that he
is using a broader definition of the term. "[C]oercion need not be a di-
rect tax in aid of religion or a test oath. Symbolic recognition or accom-
modation of religious faith may violate the Clause in an extreme case."'150
Justice Kennedy thereby strips the word "coercion" of the connotation of
147 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3128-29.
148 Id. at 3136. See also supra note 118-20 and accompanying text.
149 See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Abington Township School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
150 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3137.
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force or compulsion usually associated with it.51 Under this broader
view of "coercion," certain symbolic speech by the government can be
considered coercive.
This formulation raises another concern, however. Under Justice
Kennedy's broader definition, all forms of government speech or action
can qualify as coercion. Every law, every criminal sentence, every speech
by a public official, and every court opinion is designed to enforce some
particular view of public policy.1 52 Whether the government act is
designed to coerce the public not to commit murder, to follow the speed
limit, or to hold certain beliefs, the government's only method of effec-
tively speaking on a subject is by taking some sort of "coercive" action.
Perhaps Justice Kennedy does not intend the term "coercion" to de-
scribe such action, but one could not be sure given his incomplete defini-
tion of the word. Consider the two examples of indirect coercion which
Justice Kennedy suggested would constitute establishment clause
violations.
First, it would be coercive to erect a Latin cross on the roof of a
government building. The obtrusive nature of such a year-round dis-
play, in Justice Kennedy's view, "would place the government's weight
behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular reli-
gion." 153 But this is indistinguishable from the creche in the Allegheny
County courthouse. A display of the birth of Christ placed at the'main
and most beautiful area of the courthouse is an equally obvious effort to
proselytize. A cross on top of a building might easily be passed day after
day without being noticed by many visitors to the building. But no visi-
tor could miss the message of "Gloria in Excelsis Deo" on display in that
Allegheny County courthouse.1 54 Communicating a religious message is
necessary for proselytization, and it would seem that placing a religious
symbol in a prominent place during a particularly religious time of the
year would be as effective a way, if not more so, to deliver such a
message.
The second example Justice Kennedy offers where the government
could violate his test by using religious symbols is if the government were
to recognize all significant Christian holidays with a display but fail to
recognize holidays of any other faith.1 55 But this assertion dooms the
coercion test to the status of a "jurisprudence of minutiae"-a label
151 Webster's Dictionary defines "coerce" as:
1: to restrain, control, or dominate, nullifying individual will or desire, 2: to compel an act
or choice by force, threat, or other pressure.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IrNrERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 439 (1976). The same word is defined by Black's
Law Dictionary as:
compelled to compliance; constrained to obedience, or submission in a vigorous or forcible
manner.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 234 (5th ed. 1979).
152 A case in point is the recent decision by Congress to restrict funding to the National Endow-
ment for the Arts after the NEA funded an exhibition which several members of Congress found
objectionable. Congress used its coercive power to enforce its view of what is and what is not art.
153 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3137.
154 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
155 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3139.
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which Justice Kennedy 'affixes to the endorsement test.'5 6 If the display
of a creche on one holiday is permissible and a display on every holiday is
not, one wonders where to draw the line: recognizing two Christian and
two Jewish holidays? Three Christian, one Jewish, and an Islamic? Jus-
tice Kennedy offers little in the way of standards or criteria for defining
the threshold of coercion. Just as much as, if not more than the endorse-
ment test, the coercion test requires some degree of subjective, policy-
laden line-drawing.
B. Presumption of Invalidity as Suggested by Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, in his opinion in Allegheny County,157 suggested a fur-
ther clarification of endorsement analysis. "In my opinion the Establish-
ment Clause should be construed to create a strong presumption against
the display of religious symbols on public property."' 5 8 The Court has
employed similar presumptions in free speech and free press clause
cases. In support of this suggestion, Justice Stevens argued that religious
displays tend to emphasize differences among individuals rather than to
achieve their intended ecumenical goals.
Under this approach, a presumption against the public use of reli-
gious symbols would only prohibit a display if, "evaluated in the context
in which it was presented, [the display] is nonsecular."'' 59 This analytical
tool is clearly intended to modify the endorsement test. While the en-
dorsement test considers the context of each governmental display, Jus-
tice Stevens' presumption adds a powerful new consequence to the
determination that a symbol is nonsecular. Given the arduous character
of establishment clause litigation, such a clear-cut rule would certainly
simplify the evaluation of religious symbols. A presumption which is
strict, yet sensitive to the context of government activity, provides a
workable tool to aid in making these difficult decisions.
Critics might label this style of analysis as "bordering on latent hos-
tility toward religion." 60 However, this moniker is undeserved. The
presumption could easily be rebutted if surrounding circumstances war-
ranted. Justice Stevens gives the example of a carving of Moses and the
ten commandments on the wall in the Supreme Court. Although, in iso-
lation, the presumption would work against such a display, when the sur-
rounding carvings of Caesar Augustus, John Marshall, William
Blackstone and others are taken into consideration, the presumption is
rebutted. 161 Portraying Moses with the ten commandments in these cir-
156 Id. at 3144.
157 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
158 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3131.
159 Id. at 3132.
160 Id. at 3135. The phrase "latent hostility toward religion" is used somewhat carelessly here.
The common meaning of hostile is "of or relating to an enemy; marked by malevolence and a desire
to injure." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTONARYI094 (1976). If anything, the majority
is displaying concern for those of the religious minority rather than overt antagonism toward reli-
gion in general.
161 Justice Stevens notes that all of these great leaders appear in friezes on the Supreme Court
walls. Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3132.
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cumstances is not a governmental endorsement of religion, but rather an
historical display of the great lawgivers in the history of mankind.
Although Justice Stevens' suggestion pertained only to those cases
where the government has chosen to employ a religious symbol, courts
could easily use this device in other establishment clause cases. Such a
construction could be adapted to cases such as Texas Monthly by having
the presumption arise whenever a government uses religion as a distin-
guishing factor among its citizens. A showing that, under the circum-
stances, the distinction did not have the purpose or effect of endorsing
religion would, of course, rebut the presumption.
In sum, employing a presumption against the government's use of
religious symbols or distinctions would be a valuable analytical tool for
the courts. With the foundation established, the analysis would then turn
to the endorsement test, where the courts would determine if the chal-
lenged action had the purpose or effect of endorsing religion. If not, the
presumption would be rebutted.
V. Conclusion
Justice O'Connor's concern with the perception of an endorsement
of religion has permanently modified the Lemon test. The purpose prong
of that test now asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion.' 62 The effects prong of that test asks whether,
taking into consideration the context of the governmental act, it is suffi-
ciently likely that a reasonable observer would perceive the act as an en-
dorsement or disapproval of their individual religious choices. 163 The
entanglement prong remains as it was stated in Lemon: whether the act
fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion.1
64
This change in establishment clause analysis parallels a deeper
change in the thinking of the Court. The minority in Lynch, 165 with the
addition ofJustice O'Connor, is the new majority in establishment clause
cases. This shift in power is reflected in the way in which Texas Monthly
departs from Walz, and Allegheny County from Lynch. The new majority,
using the endorsement test, is more likely to strike down governmental
use of religious symbols or distinctions as establishment clause viola-
tions. The remaining Justices 166 represent a loosely aligned minority
which has expressed misgivings about the whole Lemon framework167 and
would allow government more leeway in using religious symbols and
religious distinctions.
Justice Kennedy suggests that the focus should be on whether the
government is trying to coerce observers to adopt certain religious be-
162 Edwards v. Aguillard 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690).
163 Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3115.
164 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
165 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun.
166 Justices Rehnquist, White, Kennedy and Scalia.
167 See Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of
Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
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liefs. But as indicated above, the coercion approach causes more
problems than it solves.' 68 Its adoption would replace one analytical
framework, which has been criticized as being inconsistent and unpre-
dictable, with another which is no better. Difficult line-drawing, which
seems to be inherent in establishment clause analysis, would not be
avoided by adopting the coercion test.
Nevertheless, both Texas Monthly and Allegheny County indicate that
the Lemon test, as modified by endorsement, is alive and well. The debate
now turns to the specifics of endorsement analysis.
Justice Stevens has suggested that there should be a strong pre-
sumption against government display of religious symbols. This device
could be an extraordinarily useful tool in all establishment clause cases if
expanded to apply to any governmental distinction based on religion.
Use of this presumption is consistent with the majority's view of the im-
portance of governmental neutrality in religious affairs.
The Court must also determine the perspective from which to judge
the effect of endorsement. The better reasoned view is implied by Justice
Brennan: a genuine objection by any reasonable observer should signal a
violation of the effects prong. This could be combined with the adoption
and expansion of Justice Stevens' presumption of invalidity to simplify
establishment clause litigation by allowing for the following procedure.
Once it is established that the government has used a religious sym-
bol or distinction, a presumption would arise that the establishment
clause had been violated. The government could then rebut this pre-
sumption by establishing that: (1) the purpose of the action was not to
endorse or disapprove of any religion or religion in general; (2) no rea-
sonable observer would perceive the action as an endorsement of reli-
gion which makes her feel less than a full member of the political
community; and (3) the action does not foster an excessive entanglement
between government and religion. This procedural shift would result in
a greater burden upon government, but this burden would be out-
weighed by greater consistency and predictability in establishment clause
litigation. In addition, the government would only face this burden if it
insisted upon using religious symbols or distinguishing between its citi-
zens on the basis of religion. Some may view this formulation as latently
hostile to religion; however, in practice, it would allow both the govern-




168 See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
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